Price River Coal Company and/or Cigna Insurance Company  v. Industrial Commission of Utah and Marte T. Mabbutt : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Price River Coal Company and/or Cigna
Insurance Company v. Industrial Commission of
Utah and Marte T. Mabbutt : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; James M. Elegante; Parsons, Behle and Latimer; Attorneys
for Plaintiffs.
Virginius Dabney; Attorneys for Defendant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Price River Coal Company and/or Cigna Insurance Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah and Marte T. Mabbutt, No.
880372 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1163
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
*: F u 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
C/f- STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE RIVER COAL COMPANY 
and/or CIGNA INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and MARIE T. MABBUTT, Widow of 
Fred C. Mabbutt, deceased, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 88-0372-CA 
Priority Classification: 6 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT MABBUTT 
ON WRIT OF REVIEW FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS TO 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ, 
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Mabbutt 
350 South 400 East, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9000 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Attorneys for Defendant Industrial Commission 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1015 
JAMES M. ELEGANTE, ESQ. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
*"• **.-<» i t , . 
on? r 
THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE RIVER COAL COMPANY 
and/or CIGNA INSURANCE 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
and MARIE T. MABBUTT, Widow of 
Fred C. Mabbutt, deceased, 
Defendants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANT MABBUTT 
ON WRIT OF REVIEW FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS TO 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
VIRGINIUS DABNEY, ESQ. 
DABNEY & DABNEY, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant Mabbutt 
350 South 400 East, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9000 
DAVID L. WILKINSON, ESQ. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Attorneys for Defendant Industrial Commission 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1015 
JAMES M. ELEGANTE, ESQ. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Case No. 88-0372-CA 
Priority Classification: 6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
Table of Contents i 
Table of Authorities ii 
Jurisdiction and Nature of Proceedings 1 
Issues Presented 1 
Statement of the Case 1 
Statement of the Facts 3 
Summary of the Argument 9 
Argument 11 
I THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
PROPERLY FOLLOWED THE MANDATE OF 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 11 
II THIS COURT MUST UPHOLD THE 
FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNLESS THEY 
ARE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 14 
III THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION 
IS NOT BASED UPON IMPROPER 
FINDINGS OF FACT 14 
IV THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DID NOT 
DEMONSTRATE ANY BIAS DURING THE HEARING 19 
V THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
DID COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
SECTION 63-43B-10(l) (a) 20 
Conclusion 21 
Certificate of Service 22 
Addendum 23 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES: 
Allen v. Industrial Commission 
729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) .......2,10,11,12 
American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Commission 
752 P.2d 912 (Utah App. 1988)••••.••••••••••.••••• 14 
Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission 
731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986) 1,2,3,19,18 
Rushton v. Gelco Express 
/ O 2* i r . ^ C l l U l 7 ( U L d U l b / O O j « « . « « . . . « e o o e e e « e c c * . « e e « « « . . . . . . « 1 4 
STATUTES: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-86 (Supp. 1988) 1 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-43b-10(1)(a) (Supp 1988) ...20,21 
ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from final agency action in the form of an 
order entered by the Industrial Commission* of Utah on May 23, 
1988. This Court has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-14 (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission complied with Price 
River Coal Company v. Industrial Commission 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 
1986) when it once again awarded benefits to the respondent, 
Marie T. Mabbutt. 
2. Whether the Industrial Commission committed reversible 
error in its decision. 
3. Whether the Administrative Law Judge demonstrated 
extreme bias during the hearing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 13, 1982, Marie T. Mabbutt, hereinafter referred 
to as "respondent," filed a claim for dependent's benefits and/or 
burial benefits with the Industrial Commission of Utah. A 
hearing was held on May 8, 1984, before Keith E. Sohm, 
Administrative Law Judge, Industrial Commission of Utah. The 
matter was then referred to a medical panel on May 23, 1984, by 
Judge Sohm. 
Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge awarded benefits to 
the respondent. But on December 31, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court 
remanded this matter to the Industrial Commission for additional 
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findings of fact. Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
731 P. 2d 1079 (Utah 1986). The Supreme Court found that the 
Commission had to determine the nature of Fred C. Mabbutt's 
activities in the mine on the day of his death. The 
Administrative Law Judge made his tentative findings on July 8, 
1987, and again referred the matter to the same to the medical 
panel for further evaluation. The medical panel filed its 
supplemental report on September 1, 1987. On February 24, 1988, 
the Administrative Law Judge filed his final Order Upon Remand 
again awarding benefits to the respondent. 
On March 7, 1988, petitioners filed a Motion for Review 
objecting to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that both 
legal and medical causation had been established, as required by 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). On 
March 10, 1988, respondent filed a Cross-Motion for Review 
arguing that the Administrative Law Judge should have awarded 
attorneys' fees in addition to benefits awarded as opposed to 
making them part of respondent's award and that the fee should 
have been calculated based on a percentage of more than just the 
first six years of benefits plus any interest awarded. On May 
23, 1988, the Industrial Commission denied petitioners' Motion 
for Review. With respect to respondent's Motion for Cross-
Review, the Commission found that the Administrative Law Judge 
correctly calculated the attorneys fee. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The deceased, Fred C. Mabbutt, was born on November 26, 
1919, and was one month short of his 62nd birthday when, on 
October 23, 1981, he was found dead in the #3 mine of Price River 
Coal Company located in Helper, Utah at the end of an eight-hour 
shift as an underground coal mine beltman. At the time of his 
death, he was married to Marie T. Mabbutt, the respondent. Mr. 
and Mrs. Mabbutt were married on December 9, 1940. 
Mr. Mabbutt weighed over 200 pounds and was approximately 
six feet tall. He had been treated for diabetes which was 
diagnosed in 1975, and for high blood pressure which leveled off 
when he began taking insulin. Mr. Mabbutt had gout for which he 
took medication. He took Turns and aspirin to work in his lunch 
bucket for his heartburn. He had surgery for kidney stones, skin 
cancer near his eye and he had a long history of hypertension. 
He was neither a smoker nor a coffee drinker. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 32-
34, 39] 
Mr. Mabbutt had been employed by Price River Coal Company 
for approximately 6 years as a beltman which required him to keep 
certain pumps and belts functioning as well as keeping the belts 
and the areas around them clear of coal dust and other materials 
that accumulated. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 26]. He worked in an area 
located near two mine shafts which intersected at right angles 
where a high conveyor belt, the top being about ten feet high, 
carried coal and other materials to a point where it intersected 
a lower conveyor belt which was less than waist high. [R. Vol. 2 
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pg. 63, 92] About 70 feet along the higher belt line was a 
reservoir where coal dust slurry accumulated which was pumped 
onto the higher beltline. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 46-92] At times Mr. 
Mabbutt had to clear the pump. A slop-over of slurry consisting 
of a thick black liquid had to either be shoveled with a square-
nosed shovel up onto the high belt, or scooped into five gallon 
buckets which then had to be carried and dumped onto the other 
conveyor belt. The bucket filled with slurry weighed about 60-70 
pounds when full and Mr. Mabbutt carried a bucket in each hand. 
[R. Vol. 2 pg. 46,47,92-96, 149] 
Mr. Mabbutt was also required to scrape materials out from 
under the beltline with a long-handled shovel, do "muck" and 
cleanup work, spray the area with a hose, and "rock-dust" the 
area. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 92-97] The water hose was used to settle 
the coal dust as a precautionary measure to avoid explosions as 
was the rock dusting. In addition, the area where Mr. Mabbutt 
worked was a secondary emergency exit for underground workers in 
the event of a disaster in the mine, such as an explosion or a 
fire. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 68-69] Hence, for safety reasons, Mr. 
Mabbutt's job required him to keep the area clear of debris and 
maintain it in good condition for escaping miners in the event of 
an emergency. He also had to keep his work area clear to avoid 
being cited by the MSHA. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 46,58,68-69] 
Mrs. Mabbutt testified that her husband "... was always 
disgusted because whoever worked the shift before him would not 
clean up the beltline or do his job properly, and every time Fred 
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went to work he would have to clean up after the other shift 
besides his own." [R. Vol. pg 27] Mr. Mabbutt essentially 
worked his shift alone without supervision and, in fact, it was 
not unusual for him to work an entire 8-hour shift without seeing 
a fellow worker. 
On Friday October 23, 1981, Mr. Mabbutt left his home at 
6:00 o'clock in the morning to pick up Richard K. Westbrook, a 
fellow coal miner on his way to work that day. [R. Vol. 2 pg 
29,55] Mrs. Mabbutt testified that she did not notice anything 
unusual about her husband when he left for work that morning. 
[R. Vol. 2 pg. 29] Mr. Westbrook indicated that Mr. Mabbutt 
appeared normal. In fact, Mr. Mabbutt talked about going hunting 
with his children. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 54-55] 
During his last work day, Mr. Mabbutt commenced work and had 
been at his station for approximately three hours when Gene M. 
Miller, a belt inspector, visited his area at approximately 11:15 
in the morning. [R. Vol. 2. pg 62, Vol. 1 pg. 134] When Mr. 
Miller arrived at Mr. Mabbutt's work area, he noticed a build-up 
of muck. [R. Vol 1 pg. 125-126] Mr. Miller also observed Mr. 
Mabbutt as he attempted to stuff a one-inch water hose down into 
a larger hose which was attached to the sump-pump in an effort to 
unplug the pump. In doing this, water was squirting all over Mr. 
Mabbutt. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 64, Vol. 1 pg. 132] When asked what he 
was doing, Mr. Mabbutt swore violently and complained about the 
plugged-up pump. Mr. Miller perceived Mr. Mabbuttfs swearing as 
very unusual since he had never heard him swear before. [R. Vol. 
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2 pg. 64-65] Mr. Miller noted that the method being used to 
unplug the pump was one that he had never observed before. [R. 
Vol 2 pg. 68] Mr. Miller noticed that Mr. Mabbutt1s clothes were 
extremely wet. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 64,65,70-72,76-77,79] Mr. Miller 
also testified that he could not hear the pump working at that 
time, which meant that the area was getting more plugged up as 
time went on. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 67] 
The area of the build-up was approximately ten by twenty 
feet. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 125,127,130] That area was on a slope, the 
deepest end being two feet. [R. Vol 1 pg. 125, 129] [2nd Tr. 32, 
36] This area was referred to as a "sump area." [R. Vol 1 p 
129-130] The pump which was normally used to pump the muck from 
this area was plugged at the time when Mr. Miller arrived in the 
area on October 23, 1981. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 130,132] Mr. Miller 
also observed slurry going over the dam. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 67] [1st 
Tr. 48] Mr. Miller further observed Mr. Mcibbutt attempting to 
move the 110 pound pump out of the muck. Mr. Mabbutt was 
straining to pull on the hose attached to the pump and appeared 
extremely agitated and angry to Mr. Miller. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 
65,70-72,78] 
With the pump plugged, the only way to clear the sump area 
was to fill five gallon buckets and carry the muck out of the 
sump area. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 130] Mr. Miller testified that he 
observed Mr. Mabbutt fill a "couple buckets" and carry the filled 
buckets out of the area. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 126] Mr. Miller stated 
that while he was at lunch he saw Mr. Mabbutt make "several 
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trips" carrying two buckets at a time. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 126] These 
filled buckets weighed about 50 to 60 pounds each. Mr. Mabbutt 
had to walk sixty to seventy feet up a six to eight percent 
incline to the second belt to empty the buckets. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 
100-101] [2nd Tr. 7-8] The ground was not flat or level. Mr. 
Mabbutt had to walk where the coal had "been mined out." [R. Vol 
1 pg. 101] Mr. Miller testified that it required the filling and 
carrying of at least one hundred buckets to clear the area where 
Mr. Mabbutt was working of all the muck. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 134] 
Although Mr. Miller asked Mr. Mabbutt to eat lunch with him 
at that time, Mr. Mabbutt replied that he had to get the pump 
unclogged, and declined. [R. Vol 2 pg. 69-70] In fact, Mr. 
Miller testified that he asked Mr. Mabbutt three times to sit 
down and eat his lunch, but Mr. Mabbutt refused to do so and 
continued trying to unplug the clogged sump pump. [R. vol 2 pg. 
72] Mr. Miller stated that at one point Mr. Mabbutt became so 
upset that he threw his gloves on the ground. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 
70,73] Mr. Miller also testified that Mr. Mabbutt's hands and 
face appeared a bit pale at that time [R. Vol. 2 pg. 73], and 
that it could not have been due to rock dusting, since it was too 
early in the shift for Mr. Mabbutt to be utilizing the rock 
duster. [R. Vol 2 pg. 82] 
At the conclusion of Mr. Mabbutt's shift, and at the request 
of Mr. Westbrook who was supposed to ride home from work with Mr. 
Mabbutt on that day, a search was made for Mr. Mabbutt who had 
not come out of the mine on time. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 76] His 
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replacement on the following shift, Evelyn L« Hicks, reached the 
area at approximately 4:20 p.m. and noticed that the area had not 
been rock-dusted. She heard the pump operating and water running 
onto the higher belt [R. Vol. 2. pg. 97] [1st Tr. 78]. When she 
saw Mr. Mabbutt's coat and lunch bucket, she began looking for 
him. Ms. Hicks found Mr. Mabbutt laying flat on his back with 
his head near the sidewall of the shaft. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 98-99] 
One of Mr. Mabbut's eyes was open and the other was closed. Mr. 
Mabbutt was holding the small water hose, which was still 
running, in his left hand and water was spurting across Mr. 
Mabbutt's body. Nearby was one empty, but wet, muck bucket and a 
No. 2 shovel. The area around the sump pump was clear and no 
build-up of muck was evident. [R. Vol 2 pg. 100-101] 
At the July 7, 1987 hearing, Mr. Miller testified that the 
water and coal fines had built up and were spilling over the dam 
when he came over the overcast. [R. Vol. 1 pg» 124-125] 
Mr. Miller further testified that the area in which there 
was a build up of material was approximately ten by twenty 
feet. The build up of material was approximately two inches to 
two feet deep. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 125] 
Mr. Miller also testified that he observed Mr. Mabbutt 
making "several trips11 carrying two buckets weighing sixty to 
seventy pounds each. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 126]. Finally, Mr. Miller 
testified that it would require at least one hundred buckets to 
clear the size of spill he observed. [R. Vol 1 pg. 134]. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. Mabbutt died of a heart attack he suffered while working 
as a beltman in the appellant's mine. As a beltman, his duties 
required him to keep his work area clean and to make sure that 
the conveyor belts were functioning. 
But, on October 23, 1981, Mr. Mabbutt was confronted with 
more. On that day, the pump which is utilized to keep the work 
area clean was not working. As a result, the "slurry" and "muck" 
material was rapidly accumulating in Mr. Mabbutt's work area. 
There was a spill of this material which covered a ten by twenty 
foot area and was two inches to two feet deep. Mr. Mabbutt 
attempted to unplug the pump by stuffing a smaller water hose 
into the pump line. He also attempted to pull the pump out of 
the "muck." Mr. Mabbutt was seen making several trips carrying 
two buckets filled with "muck" and which weighed 60 to 70 pounds, 
up a 7% incline to dump the "muck", which was accumulating in his 
work area and which was spilling over a dam, onto a second 
belt. Given the size of the "muck" spill, the uncontradicted 
testimony was that it would require at least 100 buckets to clean 
the spill. This meant that Mr. Mabbutt would be required to make 
fifty trips of approximately sixty to seventy feet while carrying 
two heavy buckets. 
Mr. Mabbutt was very frustrated over the accumulation and 
over the plugged pump. Mr. Mabbutt was also under pressure to 
clean his work area. Not only because it was his job, but 
because this area also served as a secondary escape way for the 
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miners in the event an emergency occurred in the mine. And, a 
build up of this material could result in citations from MSHA. 
All of the facts support the Industrial Commission's 
conclusion that Mr. Mabbutt's employment activity on October 23, 
1981 involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over his 
non-employment life. 
The sum and substance of the medical testimony presented to 
the Industrial Commission was that the unusual and extraordinary 
exertion which Mr. Mabbutt experienced on October 23, 1981, 
substantially contributed to and was a precipitating factor 
resulting in Mr. Mabbutt's fatal heart attack. 
Appellants have failed to present any evidence which 
contradicts the evidence presented by respondent with respect to 
the work activities performed by Mr. Mabbutt on October 23, 
1981. Appellants have also failed to present any medical 
evidence to contradict the findings of the medical panel or 
respondent's medical expert. 
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this matter to the 
Industrial Commission for a specific purpose. The Industrial 
Commission has now satisfied the requirements of the Utah Supreme 
Court and has again awarded respondent the bemefits to which she 
is entitled. This Court has no choice but to affirm the final 
administrative decision of the Industrial Commission. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
PROPERLY FOLLOWED THE MANDATE OF 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
1. Legal Cause. 
The Industrial Commission properly followed the 
direction given by the Utah Supreme Court in Price River Coal 
Company v. Industrial Commission/ 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986), 
after applying the Allen v. Industrial Commission/ 729 P.2d. 15 
(1986) analysis to the initial findings and conclusions entered 
by the Industrial Commission in this matter. The Utah Supreme 
Court remanded this case to the Industrial Commission "so that 
proper findings of fact [could] be entered and the Allen standard 
[could] be applied to them to determine legal cause11 Allen v. 
Industrial Commission/ at 1083. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 59-62] 
Since Mr. Mabbutt suffered from a pre-existing 
condition/ the Industrial Commission must find that his 
"employment activity involved some unusual or extraordinary 
exertion over and above the usual wear and tear and exertion on 
non-employment life." Price River Coal Company v. Industrial 
Commission at 1082. [R. Vol. 1. pg. 61] If this finding is made, 
then the "legal cause" requirement has been satisfied. Id. 
In his Order Upon Remand the Administrative Law Judge made 
just such a finding. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 372-379] The Administrative 
Law Judge concluded that Mr. Mabbutt was a coal miner who was 
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confronted with a plugged sump pump. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 376] As a 
result of this, coal fines and muck spilled over a dam creating a 
large puddle which was two inches to two feet deep and covered a 
ten by twenty feet area. [R. Vol 1 pg. 124-125, 376] The 
Administrative Law Judge heard testimony that Mr. Mabbutt was 
pulling on the pump and that he was attempting to unplug the pump 
by utilizing a water hose. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 132, Vol. 2 pg. 68] In 
addition, Mr. Mabbutt knew he was working in an area which, in 
the event of an emergency, would be used by the miners as a 
secondary escape way. [R. Vol 1. pg. 103]. 
The Administrative Law Judge heard further testimony that 
Mr. Mabbutt filled five gallon buckets with "muck" and carried 
two such buckets to the next belt. Mr. Mabbutt had to carry the 
buckets up a steep 7% slope for approximately seventy feet. Each 
bucket weighed approximately sixty-five pounds when filled with 
muck. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 100-101] 
The uncontracticted testimony was that it would have taken 
at least one hundred buckets filled with muck to clean out the 
area in which Mr. Mabbutt was working. [R. Vol. 1 p 134] 
Based upon the uncontradicted facts, the Industrial 
Commission concluded that Mr. Mabbutt's "employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in 
everyday life because of his condition." Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, at 25. [R. Vol 1. pg. 372-379] Hence, the legal 
cause requirement adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Allen has 
clearly been satisfied by the respondent. 
12 
2. Medical Cause. 
The Utah Supreme Court also required the respondent to 
establish medical cause. Allen v. Industrial Commission at 27. 
Under the medical cause test, the respondent "must show by 
evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the stress, strain, or 
exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting 
injury or disability." Id. 
Applying this portion of the Allen requirements to this 
case, it once again becomes clear that the medical cause 
requirement has also been satisfied. Appellants' expert, Dr. 
Fowles, agreed that Mr. Mabbutt's work activities, on the day of 
his death, probably contributed substantially to increase Mr. 
Mabbutt's risk of having a fatal heart attack. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 
320-322,365,367,368] 
The medical panel found that Mr. Mabbutt's work 
activities on October 23, 1981, led to his death. [R. Vol. 3 pg. 
389-390] All the medical evidence presented to the Industrial 
Commission supports the conclusion that Mr. Mabbutt's work 
activities on October 23, 1981, were a sufficient precipitating 
factor resulting in his death by heart attack. [R. Vol. 3 pg. 
389-390, Vol. 1 pg. 300,305] 
The medical; cause requirement adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Allen has also been clearly satisfied by the respondent. 
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II 
THIS COURT MUST UPHOLD THE 
FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNLESS THEY 
ARE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 
This Court recently reaffirmed that it "will not disturb the 
findings and order of the Industrial Commission unless they are 
arbitrary and capricious, and they are arbitrary and capricious 
when they are contrary to the evidence or without any reasonable 
basis in the evidence." American Roofing Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 752 P.2d 912, 914 (Utah App. 1988) citing Rushton v. 
Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109, 111 (Utah 1986). 
Respondent has set forth herein all facts which support the 
Industrial Commission's findings and order. Based thereon, this 
Court must affirm the Industrial Commission's final Order. The 
mere fact that appellants are not satisfied with the findings and 
order does not render them arbitrary and capricious. 
Ill 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION 
IS NOT BASED UPON IMPROPER FINDINGS OF FACT 
In their brief appellants cry foul because the Industrial 
Commission allegedly made some findings which are not supported 
by evidence. Appellants cite the following findings in their 
brief. 
1. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt 
tried to lift and pull the 110 pound pump out of the sump, "but 
with no success." [R. Vol. 1 pg. 375] 
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The only testimony on this finding was given by Mr. 
Miller who stated that he was watching Mr. Mabbutt pull on the 
pump but that he [Mr. Miller] could not actually see the pump. 
[R. Vol. 2 pg. 71] 
There is no evidence that the pump was ever pulled out 
of the muck prior to the area being cleaned by Mr. Mabbutt. 
2. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Miller 
"observed that the coal fine and muck had spilled over the block 
dam. . ." [R. Vol. 1 pg. 375] 
Mr. Miller testified he observed "coal fines and water 
and so forth" spill over the dam. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 124-125] 
3. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt 
made four trips from the sump area to the No. 4 belt. [R. Vol. 1 
pg. 375] 
Mr. Miller testified that he could not state exactly 
how many trips Mr. Mabbutt made. Mr. Miller did however state he 
observed Mr. Mabbutt make "several trips two buckets each time, 
say he made four trips." [R. Vol. 1 pg. 126] 
4. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt was 
not shoveling coal fine from beneath the rollers [R. Vol. 1 pg. 
375] 
There is no evidence that Mr. Mabbutt was doing any 
shoveling except to fill his fine buckets with muck. Appellants' 
citation to 0'Green's testimony [See Appellants' Brief pg. 10] is 
an unconscionable attempt to distort the truth. 0'Green's 
testimony was based upon observations he made after Mr. Mabbutt's 
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body had been found, at which time the pump was working and after 
Mr. Mabbutt had cleared the "muck spill" by using his back, his 
legs, his arms, his shovel and his buckets. 
5. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt was 
shoveling and carrying buckets until his death. [R. Vol. 1 pg 
375] 
When Mr. Mabbutt1 s body was found, he was holding a 
water hose, which was still running, and a shovel and wet muck 
bucket were found close by. [R. Vol. 2 pg. 100-101] This type 
of physical evidence lends itself to the logical and reasonable 
conclusion that Mr. Mabbutt was indeed using the muck bucket and 
shovel until his demise. The fact that the area had not been 
"rock dusted" [R. Vol. 2 pg. 97] could lead a person to the 
reasonable conclusion that Mr. Mabbutt was still carrying the 
heavy buckets and was also attempting to unplug the pump, which 
was what he had been doing when Mr. Miller observed him during 
the lunch hour. 
6. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbutt was 
under pressure to keep the area clean. [R. Vol. 1 pg 376] 
Mr. Mabbutt was under extreme pressure. It was his job 
as a beltman to keep the area clean. The area was a secondary 
escape way, and if the area was not kept clean, there was a 
potential MSHA violation. 
In view of this and the fact that the pump was not working 
and that the water and coal fines were spilling over the dam, it 
is hard to accept appellants' argument that Mr. Mabbutt felt no 
pressure. 
16 
7. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Mabbott's 
"work activities on October 23, 1981, involved [unusual 
exertion]" and that these activities "contributed something 
substantial to increase the risk which he already faced in every 
day life because of his condition." [R. Vol. 1 pg. 376 
The record is littered with facts that support the 
Administrative Law Judge's conclusion. Mr. Mabbutt was agitated 
[R. Vol. 2 pg. 65] the pump was not working [R. Vol. 2 pg. 68] 
the water and coal fines were spilling over the dam [R. Vol. 1 
pg. 124-125] he attempted to pull the pump out of the mud [R. 
Vol. 2 pg. 71], he carried five gallon buckets filled with muck, 
which weighed approximately 65 pounds, up a 7% incline for a 
distance of 60-70 feet [R. Vol. 1 pg. 100-101,126] and he was 
under the stress of attempting to keep his work area, which was 
also a secondary escape way, clear [R. Vol. 1 pg. 103]. 
Appellants1 charge that findings of unusual exertion is 
» 
based upon speculation and the further charge that the 
Administrative Law Judge inferences are not reasonable. 
[Appellants1 brief p 13-14] The one witness upon who appellants 
rely throughout is 0'Green. 01Green's testimony is based 
entirely upon speculation and assumption. O1Green did not work 
with, talk to or even see Mr. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981. 
0'Green did not inspect Mr. Mabbutt's work area until after Mr. 
Mabbutt's body had been taken out of the mine. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 
161] 0'Green's testimony is just not credible. Mr. Miller 
testified that the water and coal fine were spilling over the 
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dam. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 124-125] Mr. Miller was there, he observed 
Mr. Mabbutt, and he observed the problems confronting Mr. 
Mabbutt. 0'Green's testimony that the material in the area was 
not nearly to a point of overflow [R. Vol. 3. pg 517] is not 
credible because that testimony is based upon 0'Green's 
observation after Mr. Mabbutt had already cleaned the area. [R. 
Vol. 1 pg. 161] By citing 0'Green's testimony to support the 
argument that the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion is just 
not reasonable, counsel for appellants is distorting the record 
and is a blatant attempt to manufacture conflict where there is 
none. 
The appellants cannot cite any evidence to contradict 
that Mr. Mabbutt did make several trips carrying heavy muck 
buckets to clean his work area. Appellants cannot cite any 
evidence that Mr. Mabbutt actually managed to unplug the pump by 
using the water hose. It is counsel for the appellants who is 
making unreasonable inference by building his case on the suspect 
testimony 0'Green and Dr. Bloswick. The assumptions made and 
conclusions reached by Dr. Bloswick were based, to a great 
extent, on information he obtained from 0'Green and appellants' 
counsel, not upon his review of the record. [R Vol. 1 pg. 202-
206] 
The appellants also suggest that the Administrative Law 
Judge should have made certain findings. [Appellants' Brief pg 
16-20] There is no question that Mr. Mabbutt was suffering from 
a pre-existing condition. Price River Coal Company v. Industrial 
Commission, at 1082. 
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There is also no question that the medical evidence 
presented by the three cardiologists supports the Administrative 
Law Judge's finding of medical causation. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 377] 
Dr. Perry concluded that "I still feel that the patient's work 
activities were a material contributing factor to [Mr. Mabbutt's] 
death from coronary artery disease." [R. Vol 1 pg. 305] Mr. 
Mabbutt's work provided the impetus of exertion which contributed 
to his sudden death on October 23, 1983." [R. Vol. 1 pg. 300] 
Even appellants' expert essentially agreed with the opinion 
rendered by respondent's expert, Dr. Yanowitz. [R. Vol. 3 pg. 
541] 
IV 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE DID NOT 
DEMONSTRATE ANY BIAS DURING THE HEARING 
The record does not support appellants' allegation that the 
Administrative Law Judge demonstrated any bias. Appellants cite 
this court to a statement made by the Administrative Law Judge 
during the hearing. Appellants' charge that the Administrative 
Law Judge "interrupted and in a lengthy and argumentative manner" 
[Appellants' Brief pg 21] said "I find that hard to believe." [R. 
Vol. 1 pg. 196] 
A review of the discussion preceeding that statement 
indicates that the Administrative Law Judge did not interrupt. 
The Administrative Law Judge was attempting to clarify which 
exhibit appellants' counsel was referring to during his 
examination of the witness. [R. Vol 1 pg 194-196] 
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It was following the Administrative Law Judge's summary of 
his understanding of the witness1 testimony, and the witness 
basically agreed with that summary, that the now questioned 
statement was made. [R. Vol 1 pg. 102] This statement should 
have alerted appellants' counsel that the Administrative Law 
Judge was having some concern over the witness' testimony and 
counsel should have clarified the testimony. The Administrative 
Law Judge was sending up a "red flag" which counsel obviously 
ignored. 
As set forth herein, 0'Green's testimony is not relevant to 
the issues raised in this case. 0'Green had no contact with Mr. 
Mabbutt on October 23, 1981. 0'Green did not ever inspect Mr. 
Mabbutt's work area until after Mr. Mabbutt's body had been 
removed from the mine. 0'Green, quit simply did not offer any 
testimony which is useful in resolving the issues which the Utah 
Supreme Court wanted resolved when it remanded this matter. 
With respect to Dr. Bloswick's testimony, it has been 
established that his assumption and conclusions were based, to a 
great degree, upon information received from cippellants1 counsel, 
0'Green and not from the record. [R. Vol. 1 pg. 202-206] 
V 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
DID COMPLY WITH UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
SECTION 63-43B-10(l)(a) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-43b-10(1)(a) (Supp. 1988) 
requires the Administrative Law Judge to include in his order a 
statement of his findings of fact based exclusively on the 
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evidence of record. The findings made by the Administrative Law 
Judge in this case are supported by the evidence. The inference 
drawn in this case, although not acceptable to appellants' 
counsel, are all reasonable and are supported by the 
uncontradicted evidence. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge 
did comply with the mandate of Section 63-43b-10(l)(a). 
CONCLUSION 
This case involves a claim for benefits under the Utah 
Workers Compensation Act, a remedial act. If there is any doubt, 
it must be resolved in favor of the respondent. 
Based upon the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in Price 
River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission and upon the testimony 
and evidence presented to the Industrial Commission, it is 
respectfully requested this court affirm the May 23, 1988, order 
of the Industrial Commission. The respondent has satisfied all 
of the requirements imposed upon her by statute and by the Utah 
Supreme Court, and is therefore entitled to the benefits awarded 
by the Industrial Commission. 
DATED this 21st day of October,^ aT988. 
\ 
DAHNEY & DABNEY,\P.CJ 
/ 
Mabbutt 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct 
copies, postage pre-paid, of the foregoing document on this the 
28th day of October, 1988, to the following: 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Attorneys for Industrial Commission/ 
Second Injury Fund 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
James M. Elegante, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIME 
185 South State Street,/Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah $4111-
Plaintiff 
j 
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ADDENDUM 
Administrative Law Judge Order (December 20, 1988). 
Utah Industrial Commission Order (January 25, 1985). 
Supreme Court Decision (December 31, 1986). 
Administrative Law Judge Order Upon Remand (February 24, 
1988) . 
Utah Industrial Commission Order Denying Motion for Review 
(May 23, 1988). 
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FINDINGS OP PACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: 
HEARING ON 
OBJECTIONS: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 3349 Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on June 30, 1983 
at 1:00 p.m. o'clock* Said hearing was pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Hearing Room 3349 Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on October 24, 
1984 at 8:30 a.m. Said Hearing was pursuant to Order 
and Notice* of the Commission. 
Keith Sohm, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Tirginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Robert J. 
Shaughnessy, Attorney at Law, at the first hearing and 
by James H. Elegante and Erie V. Boorman at the 
Hearing on Objections. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The 61 year old Fred C. Habbutt was employed on the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 
p.m. shift in the underground mine of Price River Coal as a beltman which 
required him to keep eertain pumps and belts functioning as well as keeping 
tha area elear of coal, dust and other materials that may slop over or 
accumulate la his area where two belt lines intersect at right angles. The 
applicant was found dead October 23, 1981 at 4:20 p.m. at the job site with 
the cause being identified as a coronary insufficiency from an arterial 
sclerotic cardiovascular disease. In order to recover workmen*s compensation 
benefits it must be shown that he died of an accident on the job. The term 
accident has been expanded to include situations involving unusual exertion or 
unusual stress. 
MA1XE MABBUTX 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PAC1 TWO 
Prior to the Incident on Wednesday, October 21, 1981, the applicant 
ate some tacos and spent a restless night was sick and vomited about 1:00 
o'clock a.m. the next morning. Applicant*s wife urged him not go to work on 
on Thursday which he did not do, but returned to work as usual looking quite 
normal on Friday morning, October 23. The applicant usually carried Turns and 
Aspirin In his lunch pail. He weighed over 200 pounds and was about six foot 
tell. He had been treated for high blood pressure back in 1975, which leveled 
off when he began taking medication for that purpose and for sugar diabetes 
which also was discovered in 1975, for which he took one shot of insulin a day 
and watched his diet. He also had gout for which he took medication. He had 
two operations for kidney stones. He was not a smoker nor coffee drinker. 
The applicant worked in an area where two mine shafts intersected at 
right angles where a high conveyor belt, the top being about nine feet high, 
carried products to a point where it intersected a lower conveyor belt which 
was less than waist high. About 70 to 75 feet along the higher belt line was 
a reservoir where coal dust slurry accumulated which was pumped into the 
higher belt line. On occasions, the applicant had to clear the pump by 
•ticking a one inch nozzle Into the hose connected to the pump to flush it 
out. A slop over of slurry consisting of a thick black liquid had to be 
•hoveled with a square-nosed shovel up to the high belt or scooped into a five 
gallon bucket which was carried 70 to 75 feet down to the lower belt and 
dumped Into that conveyor belt. The bucket filled with slurry weighed about 
65 pounds and on occasions the applicant would carry a bucket in each hand. 
At about 11:00 a.m. a fellow employee saw the applicant and noted he 
was quite agitated because he was trying to stick the one inch hose of running 
water into the larger hose of the pump and water was splattering getting him 
wet from the spray. When asked how he was doing Mr. Mabbutt cussed quite 
violently. The fellow employee indicated that he could not hear the pump 
working at that time. He invited Mr. Mabbutt to sit down with him and have 
lunch, but Mr. Mabbutt declined. He also observed Mr. Mabbutt pulling on a 
hose to loosen the pump up out of the muck. In addition to shoveling coal 
dust and muck and doing cleanup work, the applicant was also responsible to 
•pray rock dust in the area at the end of the shift to settle the coal dust. 
A lady beltman responsible to do the same work as Mr. Mabbutt came in 
on her shift following Mabbutt's shift. She arrived at about 4:20 p.m., 
October 23, 1981 and noticed the area had not been rock dusted. She heard the 
pump operating and water running into the higher belt. When she saw Mr. 
Mabbutt9s coat and lunch bucket, she began looking for him and found him 
laying flat on his back with his head near the sidewall of the shaft. One eye 
was open and one eye was closed. He had the running hose in his left hand 
which was still spurting across his body to the right toward the sump 
reservoir. There was one empty bucket and a shovel nearby. The beltlady 
Indicated that they work a total of 7 1/2 hours out of which 1/2 hour goes to 
lunch and that the beltman spends about 5 hours shoveling and six hours on 
other duties, which, of eourse, was not consistent. 
JIIE HABBUTT 
[NDXNCS OF FACT 
ICE THREE 
The ttedieai assets of the case were referred to a medical panel for 
valuation. The medical panel returned its report a copy of which was 
irculated to the parties. The defendants objected to the medical panel 
eport. A Hearing was held on the objections. The medical witnesses 
estlfying at the Hearing on Objections were Dr. Frank G. Tanowitx, a 
:ardlologist who had previously testified on behalf of the applicant and Dr. 
Joseph Perry* the sole member of the medical panel who was called in support 
>f his medical panel report favoring the applicant. The defendants called Dr. 
Robert E. Fowles a cardiologist in support of its position that the death of 
dr. Habbutt was not industrially related. All three doctors agreed that Mr. 
Habbutt was a high risk candidate for a sudden cardiac death or for a 
continued myocardial infarction and that it could have happened at any time. 
Some of the factors which caused him to be a high risk in addition to his 
heart condition were his age, hypertension, diabetes, hypercholesterolemia and 
gout. The doctors agreed that a person with these problems may more 
frequently experience a sudden death when involved in physical exertion or 
possibly with emotional stress. 
Dr. Tanowitx appeared at the first hearing and after hearing the 
testimony concerning the type of work activities Hr. Habbutt was engaged in 
acknowledged that the work would put a strain on the cardiovascular system. 
The doctor further acknowledged that if Hr. Habbutt was in an agitated 
emotional state, that could cause an even further hemodynamic demand on the 
heart muscles. Emotional strain or pressure could aggravate and further 
increase the myocardial oxygen demands. Dr. Tanowitx felt there was a causal 
relationship between the activities that Hr. Habbutt performed and the 
stresses that he was under on the date of his death and his eventual demise. 
The doctor further indicated that after hearing final testimony on the last 
day of hearing including the testimony of Dr. Fowles that it did not change 
his opinion. Dr. Tanowitx9s opinion, of course, agreed with that of the 
medical panel. Dr. Fowles disagreed only to the extent of saying that be did 
mot have any evidence which would support, in his mind, that Hr. Habbutt 
engaged in strenuous activities or was under a stress during the period 
immediately before his demise. Dr. Tanowitx did not feel the four hour period 
between the time he was last seen by his fellow worker and the time of his 
demise was especially significant. 
The findings of the medical panel were received in evidence and the 
Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings of the medical panel as his own 
which are as follows: 
Vere the stresses at work or work activities performed by Hr. 
Habbutt a material factor contributing to his death? 
X feel the activities of the day of his death probably 
contributed to his death. I gather the day was unusually 
stressful psychologically and was demanding physically. Hr. 
Habbutt9s work seemed to involve a lot of exertion using his 
upper body which usually, or more easily provokes myocardial 
Ischemia. In addition he appears to have died shortly after a 
til MABBUTT 
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meal. A meal combined with activity seems to worsen myocardial 
ischemia. His emotional charged state probably contributed to 
his death, howevert that may or may not have been attributable 
to his employment. 
Did the employment of Mr. Habbutt merely provide the occasion or 
was it the cause of his death? 
This is a very difficult question best answered by the word 
yes. However, for the purpose of this opinion, I would have to 
say it contributed to his death but was not the cause thereof 
per ••• 
Would Mr. Habbutt have died of this condition regardless of the 
work, or might the death have occurred at home or during any 
other type of activity just as readily as it did at work? 
My opinion is that his death might have occurred at any time at 
home or any other place. However, his work provided enough in 
terms of physical and emotional stress that yit final event 
occurred while employed. Mr. Mabbutt had coronary artery disease 
which was probably without symptoms, a common problem among 
diabetics. Whether his stomach distress the day before his 
demise or his diaphoresis the day of his demise were symptoms 
related to his coronary artery disease are purely conjectural at 
this point. 
Unfortunately the first symptom which Mr. Mabbutt experienced 
was sudden death which is not uncommon occurring in 
approximately 25% of individuals with coronary artery disease. 
The stress of being behind, of needing to catch up, of eating a 
meal, then or working physically vigorously would have been 
stressful for a healthy man but far too severe a stress for a 
man with advanced coronary artery disease. Thus, these factors 
provided an excellent milieu for the appearance of his initial 
symptom, death. Thus, I feel that his employment provided a 
significant contribution to his death but was not the cause 
thereof, per se. 
Dr. Powles acknowledged that the medical panel9s opinion would be 
considered in the medical community as a reasoned medical opinion. The 
defendants in a 41 page very scholarly memorandum in opposition to grant of 
award, emphasized that there is no evidence to show that the applicant was 
engaged in unusual exertion or undergoing exceptional emotional stress 
immediately before his death. Of course the body was found about 4:20. Dr. 
Tanowitt was not concerned about that short few hours from the time the fellow 
employee testified concerning the applicant's agitated and stressful 
activities of attempting to unplug the pump earlier. Furthermore there is no 
way of knowing exactly how long before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the applicant 
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first felt the effects of that stress or at what time he actually died but It 
could have been some hours before 4:20 p.m. Ve are not called upon to 
•peculate as to those times or as to the excessive stress or exertion later in 
the afternoon in view of the fact that two fine cardiologists have agreed that 
the evidence is sufficient to convince them that the death was Industrially 
related. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that Mr. Habbutt died as the 
result of an accident In the course of his employment on October 23, 1981 
resulting from unusual exertion and stress connected with his employment on 
that fateful afternoon. The applicant Is entitled to the maximum benefits in 
affect at the time of $218.00 per week for six years for a total of $68,016.00 
with an additional $1,000.00 burial benefit. The applicant is entitled to 
$35,752.00 in a lump sum to bring payments current with weekly benefits due 
after December 21, 1984, at the rate of $218.00 per week until the balance is 
paid in full. Attorney's fees, based on the formula provided by the 
Commission, would be $9,800.00. There were no dependent children of the 
applicant and the deceased at the time of the death. 
CONCLUSIONS OP LAV: 
The defendants should pay the applicant the sums set forth above. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendants pay the applicant the 
current due amount of $35,752.00 in a lump sum and $218.00 per week beginning 
December 21 and every week thereafter until the total of $68,016.00 has been 
made less attorney's fees. The defendants shall pay the additional sum of 
$1,000.00 for burial allowance. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay out of the award the sum of 
$9,800.00 to applicant's attorney, Virginius Dabney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the applicant report immediately to the 
Industrial Commission and to the defendant any change of address or change of 
marital status. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
Shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof 
HAKIB RASBUTT 
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specifying in detail the particular errors and objections and unless so filed 
this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
\U 
Keith K. Soha 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah. this > ^ ^ i*,.Jt\ f<r*V 
ATTEST: 
/a/ Linda J. Strasburg 
Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary 
X certify that on /iU^ce ~~J+*^ •?£ 1984 % copy of the 
attached ORDER was Ballad to the following parsons at the following addresses, 
postage paid: 
Harle Habbutt 
260 Vest 500 South 
Price, Ut. 84501 
Yirginius Dabney 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 412, Kearns Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84111 
IMA 
P.O. Box 390 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84110 
tobert J. Shaughnessy 
Attorney at Law 
S43 East S00 South #3 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84102 
^James H. Elegante 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Price Biver Coal Company 
Helper, UT 84526 
THE ZMOUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH 
•f Bhorrv L* -»S 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 82001604 
* 
* 
MARIE T. MABBUTT, Widow of * 
FRED C. MABBUTT, Deceased, * 
Applicant, * DENIAL OF 
vs. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
PRICE RIVER COAL COMPANY * 
and/or INA, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On or about December 20, 1984, an Order was entered by an 
Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in 
the above entitled case. 
On or about January 7, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for 
Review from the Defendants by and through their attorney. 
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for 
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission 
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion 
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the 
Administrative Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law 
Judge of December 20, 1984, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the 
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied. 
Lenice L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on January ^ « 1985, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion for Review was mailed to the following persons at the 
following addresses, postage paid: 
Marie Mabbutt, 260 West 500 South, Price, UT 84501 
^Tirginius Dabney, Atty., 136 South Main, #412, SLC, UT 84101 
INA, P. 0. Box 390, SLC, UT 84110 
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Atty., 543 East 500 South, #3, SLC, UT 
84102 
James M. Elegante, Atty., & Erie V./ Boorman, Atty., P. 0. Box 
11898, SLC, UT 84147-0898 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
by Wilma 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Price River Coal Co. and 
Insurance Co, of North 
America, Employer-Carrier, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
The Industrial Commission of 
Utah and Marie T. Mabbutt, 
widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, 
deceased, 
Defendants, 
No. 20473 
F I L E D 
December 31, 1986 
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
On December 20, 1984, the Industrial Commission 
through its administrative law judge, issued findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and order allowing death benefits for 
applicant Marie J. Mabbutt, the widow of Fred C. Mabbutt, who 
died of a heart attack while working as a miner for plaintiff 
Price River Coal Co. ("PRC"). Mrs. Mabbutt's claim for compen-
sation was based upon the Workers7 Compensation Act, U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed., Supp. 1986), which allows compen-
sation to "the dependents of every such employee who is killed, 
by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment." 
PRC's Motion for Reconsideration or Review was denied by the 
Industrial Commission. PRC thereupon filed this action for 
review. We remand for additional findings of fact. 
Fred C. Mabbutt was found dead on October 23, 1981, at 
the end of his eight-hour shift as a belt attendant in PRC's 
underground coal mine in Helper, Utah. Mabbutt7s job consisted 
of keeping certain underground conveyor belts working, and of 
keeping the belt rollers and the area surrounding these belts 
free of coal dust and other materials which fall from the belts 
or collect around them in the normal course of their operation. 
According to both appellants and respondents, the crux 
of this case is the question of whether there is substantial 
evidence to support the decision of the administrative law 
judge that Fred Mabbutt's heart attack and subsequent death 
satisfies the requirement of section 35-1-45 that the death 
be "by accident arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment." However, both sides disagree about the appropriate legal 
standard to be applied in evaluating the evidence. Therefore, 
we have two questions on appeal. The first is what constitutes 
a compensable "accident." The second question is whether the 
evidence of Mr. Mabbutt's activities on the day of his death 
satisfies the element of causation such that the accident, if 
one did occur, was in fact related to his employment. 
There is no need to dwell at length on the question 
of the appropriate legal standard. This issue has just been 
dealt with extensively in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 
No. 20026 (Utah November 14, 1986). There we attempted to 
settle the meaning of the term "by accident," which had become 
confused by varying and inconsistent statements from this Court 
over a long period of time. The Allen definition is as follows: 
"where either the cause of the injury or the result of an exer-
tion was different from what would normally be expected to 
occur, the occurrence was unplanned, unforeseen, unintended 
and therefore 'by accident'." Id., slip op. at 9 (emphasis in 
original); see id., slip op. at 10. This definition follows 
the standard articulated in Carling v. Industrial Commission, 
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), and in earlier decisions 
of this Court that can be traced back to 1922, including most 
notably Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 
1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). This standard has been followed most 
recently in Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah 1980), and Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 
890-91 (Utah 1981). 
Under the Allen standard, it is fairly easy to 
determine that Mr. Mabbutt did die "by accident" on October 23, 
1981. His heart attack was certainly an "unexpected or unin-
tended" event that resulted in his death. Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, slip op. at 10. However, the finding that the death 
was "by accident" does not complete the analysis of whether the 
resulting injury is compensable. Under Allen, the more diffi-
cult question involves the determination of whether the injury 
had the requisite connection with the employment duties—whether 
it arose "out of or in the course of . . . employment." U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-45 (1974 ed., Supp. 1986); see Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, slip op. at 10. 
Prior to Allen, the obvious need for a test to assure 
that there was a causal connection between the injury and the 
employment duties of the injured party was sometimes dealt with 
in our cases by requiring that the occurrence resulting in the 
injury be shown to have involved "unusual exertion." Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, slip op. at 11-13. This is the standard 
apparently applied by the Commission in this case and found to 
have been met. 
However, Allen discarded the usual/unusual exertion 
distinction as a means for determining whether the injury was 
the result of an "accident." Instead, the Court dealt with the 
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causation requirement in more candid terms that focus frankly 
on the questions of legal and medical causation. It delineated 
the analysis as follows: 
Under the legal test, the law must define 
what kind of exertion satisfies the test of 
"arising out of the employment" . . . [then] 
the doctors must say whether the exertion 
(having been held legally sufficient to 
support compensation) in fact caused this 
[injury]. 
Id*, slip op. at 13-14, citing Larson, Workman's Compensation 
§ 38.83(a) at 7-276 to -277 (1986). 
In applying the Allen analysis to the present case, 
then, the first question is whether legal cause has been shown. 
Under Allen, a usual or ordinary exertion, so long as it is an 
activity connected with the employee's duties, will suffice to 
show legal cause. However, if the claimant suffers from a pre-
existing condition, then he or she must show that the employment 
activity involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over 
and above the "usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemploy-
ment life." Allen v. Industrial Commission slip op. at 16. 
In appraising whether the employee's exertion would be usual or 
ordinary in nonemployment life, an objective standard is to be 
applied that is based on the nonemployment life of the average 
person, not the nonemployment life of a particular worker. Id. 
The requirement of "unusual or extraordinary exertion" is de-
signed to screen out those injuries that result from a personal 
condition which the worker brings to the job, rather than from 
exertions required of the employee in the workplace. Id., slip 
op. at 14.1 
1. As a practical matter, when the Allen standard is being 
applied to cases which may involve preexisting conditions, 
before evidence is taken on the issue of legal cause, the 
Commission would be well-advised to first make a determination 
of whether or not the preexisting condition does in fact exist. 
If a preexisting condition exists, then the parties and the 
hearing officer will know that the "extraordinary exertion" 
test will be applied to the facts as they are developed, and 
the evidence can be appropriately prepared and marshalled for 
presentation to the fact finder. If a preexisting condition 
does not exist, the hearing may be expedited because there will 
be no need to show how hard the employee was or was not working, 
only that the employment activity led to the injury. Of course, 
even if a preexisting condition is involved, if the Commission 
finds that legal cause does exist, then it is still appropriate 
to refer the matter to a medical panel to determine whether the 
facts, as determined at the legal cause hearing, ,are sufficient 
to establish medical causation. 
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In the present case, Mabbutt was suffering from a 
preexisting condition which contributed greatly to his heart 
attack. The evidence is uncontroverted that he had hyper-
tensive cardiovascular disease, athersclerotic cardiovascular 
disease, and possibly diabetic cardiomyopathy. His hypertension 
was exacerbated by his obesity and possibly a high salt diet. 
He was a diabetic and had gout. The doctor on the medical 
panel, to which this case was referred by the administrative 
law judge, concluded that there was no evidence that Mabbutt's 
work "had any relationship to [his] development of coronary 
artery disease." 
Since Mabbutt brought heart disease to the workplace, 
before legal causation can be established, the Commission must 
find that his employment activities involved exertion or stress 
in excess of the normally expected level of nonemployment 
activity for men and women in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. If such a finding is made, then the requirement of 
legal cause is satisfied because it"is presumed that the 
employment increased the risk of injury to which that worker 
was otherwise subject in his nonemployment life. At that point 
the inquiry shifts to medical cause, i.e., whether the injured 
party's work-related activities were, in fact, causally linked 
to the injury. Id., slip op. at 17. 
The question of whether the employment activities of a 
given employee are sufficient to satisfy the legal, standard of 
unusual or extraordinary effort involves two steps. First, the 
agency must determine as a matter of fact exactly what were the 
employment-related activities of the injured employee. Second, 
the agency must decide whether those activities amounted to 
unusual or extraordinary exertion. This second determination 
is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Because the whole legal cause determination hinges 
upon the agency's findings as to what the injured worker's job-
related activities were, our review of the Commission's decision 
must begin with those findings. In the present case, we are 
unable to affirm the Commission's ruling because of the inade-
quacy of these findings. In his job, Mabbutt worked alone in 
the mine, and he encountered only one person while working on 
the day of his death. For that reason, it was necessary to 
infer what Mabbutt's activities were from the conflicting evi-
dence adduced at the hearing before the administrative law 
judge. The company brought in an expert to describe his under-
standing of the exertion required to perform that particular 
job. His testimony would support a conclusion that no unusual 
or extraordinary effort was required. On the other hand, 
Mabbutt's widow introduced testimony from a fellow worker who 
described how she had seen Mabbutt perform the work, testimony 
that might support a conclusion that the effort required was 
unusual. This testimony was disputed by the company. 
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Unfortunately, the administrative law judge's findings 
do not resolve the conflicts in the testimony and do not indi-
cate that he made a finding as to exactly what Mabbutt's activi-
ties were on the day of his death. Absent such findings, it is 
impossible for us to take the next step and determine whether 
Mabbutt's work-related activities, as found by the Commission, 
rose to the level necessary to satisfy the "unusual or extra-
ordinary" exertion threshold established by Allen for injured 
employees with preexisting problems. 
The administrative law judge found that "Mabbutt died 
as the result of an accident in the course of his employment 
. . . resulting from unusual exertion and stress connected with 
his employment." (Emphasis added.) It may be argued that this 
is a sufficient finding of legal cause to warrant our affinning 
the Commission on this point. However, the "finding" of unusual 
exertion and stress is nothing more than a conclusion. It is 
not supported by anything that could be construed as a finding 
as to precisely what Mabbutt was doing on the day of his death. 
We cannot affirm such a mixed conclusion of fact and law when 
its necessary premises are not evident. 
There is an added problem here. The Commission 
decided this case under pre-Allen law. We cannot determine 
whether the administrative law judge used the words "unusual 
exertion" in the same sense as they have been defined by Allen. 
A talismanic incantation of "unusual or extraordinary exertion" 
is not a substitute for careful analysis by the Commission of 
whether the actual job-related activities in question exceed the 
normally expected level of activity for men and women in the 
latter half of the twentieth century.2 In the present case, we 
are uncertain of the standard applied by the Commission and 
cannot tell how the stated conclusion was reached. For that 
reason, we must reverse and remand the matter to the Commission 
so that proper findings of fact can be entered and the Allen 
standard can be applied to them to determine legal cause. 
2. We reject, categorically, the suggestion advanced by the 
company that because the belt-attendant job is sometimes per-
formed by women, it must necessarily involve less than extra-
ordinary effort or strain. We take judicial notice of the fact 
that women, as a group, tend to be smaller in size and have 
less physical strength than do men, as a group. However, with 
respect to size and strength, individual men and women are 
arrayed over a continuum from one extreme, to the other. No 
generalization can be made that because a woman performs a cer-
tain job it necessarily involves strength and exertion require-
ments at the lower end of the spectrum, and the contrary is, of 
course, true of a job performed by a man. Each job's demands 
must be evaluated on their own; they cannot be categorized as 
requiring "usual" or "unusual" exertion simply because they are 
normally done by women or men, respectively. 
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A word about the issue of medical cause. As noted, 
the administrative law judge did not resolve conflicts in the 
testimony about Mabbutt's work activities. However, he did 
adopt the findings of the medical panel, which contained a 
doctor's assumptions about what Mabbutt was actually doing on 
the day in question, and which then relied on those factual 
assumptions in finding a causal link between the work and his 
death. The factual recitation in the panel report'was derived 
from the conflicting evidence presented at the hearing and in-
ferences drawn from that evidence. In a number of respects, as 
the company demonstrated at the hearing on its objections to 
the medical panel report and in its brief on appeal, the panel 
was confused as to some of the basic duties of Mabbutt's job 
and made assumptions about his actual activities which are 
unsupported by the evidence. 
It is not the role of the medical panel to resolve 
conflicts in the factual evidence regarding the injured party's 
activities. Section 35-1-85 of the Code places that responsi-
bility solely on the Commission. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974 
ed.). Under Allen, as before, the medical panel is only to 
take the facts as found by the administrative law judge and 
consider them in light of its medical expertise to assist the 
administrative law judge in deciding whether medical cause has 
been proven. The medical panel strays beyond its province when 
it attempts to resolve factual disputes, and the administrative 
law judge improperly abdicates his function if he permits the 
panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 
(Utah 1978). 
We acknowledge that during the adjudication of this 
matter, the Commission was laboring under the confusing and 
conflicting state of the law as it had developed prior to Allen. 
The issues presented by this and similar cases should be easier 
to resolve in the future. However, questions of some subtly 
will remain in cases involving claims for internal failure 
where the worker has a preexisting condition that contributes 
to the injury and where a determination mus*t be made as to 
whether a specific work activity amounts to "unusual or extra-
ordinary" exertion. The concept of "unusual or extraordinary" 
exertion remains to be fleshed out over time. Of necessity, 
the process of pouring specific content into that concept will 
rely heavily upon the Commission's expertise in and familiarity 
with the work environment. 
This case is remanded to the Industrial Commission for 
findings of fact as to what Mabbutt's activities actually were 
on the day of his death. Based upon those findings, and upon a 
review of Allen, the Commission may then adhere to or abandon 
its conclusion that those activities amounted to extraordinary 
exertion. Because the determination of medical cause must be 
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based upon the Commission's findings as to the actual activities 
of the worker, and because the panel's report in the present 
case rested upon the medical panel's improper assumptions as 
to the facts, the Commission should resubmit the question of 
medical causation to the panel after it has made the appropriate 
factual findings. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
STEWART, Justice: (Dissenting) 
I dissent. In one of the first important tests of 
the rules laid down in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 46 Utah 
Adv. Rep. (November 14, 1986), the majority reverses and 
remands to "resubmit the question of medical causations to the 
panel." But the medical panel has already addressed that 
exact question, and the administrative law judge found that 
the decedent's death was caused by his job-related activities 
on the day that the fatal accident occurred. What more the 
court expects than has been done by the Commission is not 
explained by the majority. In my view, the administrative law 
judge was correct in his ruling, the Commission so found, and 
I agree. 
It is precisely this kind of case that demonstrates 
that our newly formulated methods of analysis will inevitably 
draw the Commission off into pathways that are bound, I 
believe, to lead to error. The Court's unfortunate require-
ment that, since Mabbutt had a preexisting condition, the 
Commission must find "that his employment activities involved 
exertion or stress in excess of the normally expected level of 
activity for men and women in the latter of the twentieth 
century," is precisely the discriminatory application of 
worker's compensation laws to workers with a preexisting 
condition, which I referred to in my dissent in Allen. 
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I would affirm on the authority of Pittsburg Testing 
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367 (Utah 1983) and Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). Like 
Pittsburg Testing and Monfredi, the decedent's preexisting 
coronary condition was clearly aggravated in this case. The 
administrative law judge made that clear in his findings: 
[T]here is no way of knowing exactly 
how long before the hour of 4:20 p.m. the 
applicant first felt the effects of that 
stress or at what time he actually died 
but it could have been some hours before 
4:20 p.m. We are not called upon to 
speculate as to those times or as to the 
excessive stress or exertion later in the 
afternoon in view of the fact that two 
fine cardiologists have agreed that the 
evidence is sufficient to convince them 
that the death was industrially related. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds 
that Mr. Mabbutt died as the result of an 
accident in the course of his employment 
on October 23, 1981 resulting from unusual 
exertion and stress connected with his 
employment on that fateful afternoon. 
I would affirm. The Commission has found the necessary 
facts and it is not for us to ignore them. 
Hall, Chief Justice, concurs in the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Stewart. 
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FURTHER EVIDENTIARY HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on July 7, 1987, at 10:00 a.m.; same 
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge 
The applicant was present and represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by 
Elegante and Hal Pos , Attorneys at Law. 
James 
SECOND HEARING ON OBJECTIONS 
TO MEDICAL PANEL REPORT: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie 
V. Boorman, Administrator. 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, on February 17, 1988, at 8:30 a.m.; same 
being pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by James 
Elegante, Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie 
V. Boorman, Administrator. 
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This case involves the death Fred C. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981. 
The Commission, previously entered an Order awarding Mr. Mabbutt*s widow death 
benefits in this case. The employer, by and through counsel, filed an appeal 
with the Utah Supreme Court. In an opinion filed December 31, 1986, a 
majority of the Court found that the case should be "remanded to the 
Industrial Commission for findings of fact as to what Mabbutt's activities 
actually were on the date of his death." The Court also instructed that "the 
Commission should resubmit the question of medical causation to the panel 
after it has made the appropriate factual findings." 
The Administrative Law Judge made his findings on or about July 8, 
1987, and referred the same to the medical panel for its further evaluation. 
The medical panel filed its supplemental report on September 1, 1987. 
Unfortunately, that report contained a typographical error in the following 
passage: "I still feel that the patient's work activities were an inmaterial 
(sic) contributing factor to his death from coronary artery disease." 
Thereafter, the applicant by and through counsel, filed a request for 
clarification of the supplemental panel report with the Commission. Shortly 
thereafter, the employer, by and through counsel, indicated that the error was 
clearly a typographical error, and that the defendants could not understand 
why the file was being referred on for further clarification. Apparently, the 
employer did not fully review the report of Dr. Perry, since the very next 
sentence stated: "If he did not have coronary artery disease, the stress and 
work of that occasion would not have percipitated (sic) his demise." Since 
this sentence is inconsistent with the sentence containing the error, 
vigilance would have required the employer to ask for a clarification also. 
The employer did not see fit to do so, but rather after the clarification was 
received from Dr. Perry indicating that the sentence should have read: I 
still feel that the patient's work activities were a material contributing 
factor to his death from coronary artery disease." Upon receipt of that 
report, then the employer filed an objection to the medical panel report 
contending that the clarification had completely altered the meaning of the 
original report. However, a close review of the file, including the medical 
panel's original report will indicate that for the panel to have made the 
finding contended by the employer, would have required a 360 degree turnabout 
on the part of the medical panel. If such were the case, again vigilance 
would have required that the employer seek a clarification of this astounding 
turnabout by the doctor, if such was the case. Therefore, in a technical 
sense, the applicant's motion to have the defendant's objections to the 
medical panel report stricken in a technical sense should be granted. 
However, recognizing that the Commission is not bound by any stricken rules of 
evidence or procedure, I have denied the motion so that a full record might be 
made in this case. 
The tenor of the employer's objection to the medical panel report is 
first that the applicant's work activities of October 23, 1981, were not the 
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necessary precipitating factor resulting in his death. However, it would 
appear to the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have missed the 
point of the Workers Compensation Act. The Act does not require that the 
death of an individual be the result of a necessary precipitating factor, 
rather the Workers Compensation Act would appear to only require that the work 
activity were a sufficient precipitating factor resulting in the death of the 
employee. When the issue is framed as such, it seems clear to the 
Administrative Law Judge that there really is no disputed medical issue in 
this case. A close and careful review of the medical report of the employer*s 
medical expert, Dr. Fowles, dated November 25, 1987, indicates as much. Dr. 
Fowles indicates **I agree with Dr. Perry that individuals without coronary 
disease usually do not die from physical exertion or emotional stress.** 
Further down in the report the doctor indicates "I repeat my statement 
rendered in the hearing of October 24, 1984, that on the whole, extreme 
physical exertion and emotional stress can accompany sudden cardiac death and 
are sufficient but are not necessary/* In Dr. Fowles testimony, he was asked 
if the activities of Mr. Mabbutt of October 23, 1981, were sufficient 
precipitating events, to which he answered they were. He also went on to 
indicate that he agreed with Dr. Perry and Dr. Yanowitz that the applicant's 
activities of October 23, 1981, contributed something substantial to increase 
the applicant's risk he already faced of having a heart attack. Again, the 
only difference of opinion, if there is one, is Dr. Fowles* belief that "the 
events on the date of his death were not necessary for sudden cardiac death.*4 
However, as I have indicated, I find that our law does not require that the 
work activities be necessary to cause a heart attack, only that they be a 
sufficient cause of the applicant's problem. For the above stated reasons, I 
find that the objections to the supplemental medical panel report of the 
employer should be, and the same are hereby denied. Accordingly, the medical 
panel report is admitted into evidence. 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Fred C. Mabbutt was employed by Price River Coal as a belt 
attendant. This job consisted of keeping the conveyor belts working and 
clean, and also required the rock dusting of the area at the end of each 
shift. On October 23, 1981, Mr. Mabbutt arose from bed as usual, and after 
shaving bade his wife goodbye. At approximately 7:00 a.m., he picked up c 
co-worker, who testified that Mr. Mabbutt seemed fine and was not complaining 
about his health or about chest pains. Mr. Mabbutt then reported for work at 
8:00 a.m., and thereupon discovered that the flyte pump or sump pump was 
clogged. As a result, the normal holding area known as the block dam, was 
accumulating coal fines (fine coal particles) in a pile. The deceased was 
attempting to unplug this clog in the pump by using a one inch high pressure 
hose in an effort to flush out the blockage. 
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At 11:15 a.m., the belt inspector, Gene Miller, approached Mr. 
Mabbutt and observed that he was attempting to unplug the pump blockage with 
the high pressure hose, and that the pump was off. Since it was close to 
lunch time, Mr. Miller suggested to the deceased that he relax and take it 
easy, since the line was already plugged. Mr. Mabbutt was clearly agitated, 
and was cursing and attempting to fix the pump. At one point, he became so 
frustrated with his in ability to disassemble a clamp, that he threw his 
gloves down onto the ground. Mr. Miller also observed that Mabbutt had a pale 
face and hands. Mr. Mabbutt was also trying to lift the 110 pound pump out of 
the sump by tugging and pulling on the hose, but with no success. Although 
Miller suggested to Mabbutt that he eat his lunch, on three separate 
occasions, Mabbutt did not do so but rather continued working in the agitated 
and charged state. The deceased had advised Mr. Miller that the pump line had 
been plugged since the beginning of his shift that morning. Mr. Miller, when 
he approached Mr. Mabbutt, observed that the coal fines and muck had spilled 
over the block dam, and had cause a puddle in the area 10 feet by 20 feet, two 
inches deep in the most shallow point, and approximately two feet deep at the 
deepest point. While Miller was attempting to coax the deceased into eating 
his lunch, he observed that Mr. Mabbutt had made four trips from the sump area 
to the #4 belt. Each bucket of muck weighed at least 65 pounds, and it was 
Mr. Mabbutt*s practice to carry two buckets at a time, so as to even out the 
weight and ease his ambulation. The distance from the sump to the #4 exchange 
belt was approximately 60-70 feet, up a 7% grade or incline. Miller estimated 
that to clean the area where Mr. Mabbutt was working would have required the 
removal of 100 buckets of muck. Mr. Miller stayed with the deceased until 
approximately noon, and at that time moved on to another belt for inspection. 
However, Mr. Mabbutt did not eat his lunch with Mr. Miller or while Mr. Miller 
was present. 
The deceased continued to work in this matter, and the last known 
contact with him was a 1:15 p.m. At that time, there was a stoppage of the 
belts in the mine, since the problem with one causes the interlock mechanism 
to terminate all belt operations. At 1:15 p.m., Miller called Mabbutt and 
inquired if there was a problem with his belt. Mabbutt advised Miller that 
the problem was not with his belt. Before the belt was shut down at 1:15, it 
had been running all morning while Mr. Mabbutt was attempting to solve the 
problem with the sump pump. As a result, the accumulations from the belt were 
also mounting, since Mr. Mabbutt was not shoveling coal fines from beneath the 
rollers or in the vicinity of the drive unit. 
The deceased continued shoveling and carrying buckets of muck to the 
#4 belt, and continually was engaged in these activities until his unfortunate 
demise. At approximately 4:20 p.m., the belt attendant assigned to the next 
shift following Mabbutt*s reported to the belt. Upon arriving, she noticed 
that the area had not been rock dusted and that the surface of the belt was 
partially clean. Further investigation lead her to the discovery of Mr. 
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Mabbutt9s body, which had a hose in the left hand, which was still running, 
and a shovel near by which was used to shovel muck onto the belt. Also near 
by was a muck bucket, which was still wet, although it had been emptied. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the deceased*s activities of 
October 23, 1983, amounted to unusual exertion. What we have is a coal miner 
who was confronted with a plugged sump pump, which was causing coal fines and 
muck to spill over the block dam resulting in a large puddle. The bait line 
is a secondary escape way true enough from the mine, but testimony clearly 
indicated that in the event of a fire or other tragedy in the mine which would 
prevent a miner from seeing his way clear to make an escape, the belt line 
offers the only other sure method of escape, because a miner can feel his or 
her way out of the mine by following the belt line. Thus it is reasonable to 
conclude that Mr. Mabbutt felt he was under some pressure to keep that area of 
the mine clean in the event an accident should occur. In addition, Mr. 
Mabbutt was under the pressure of being behind in his work, and being 
frustrated by an inoperative piece of machinery. There was a possibility of 
an MSHA citation being issued if the pile were too big, which only helped add 
urgency to Mabbuttfs efforts. 
Based on the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Miller, I conclude that 
Fred Mabbutt moved the estimated 100 buckets of muck to clean out his area of 
the belt, or some amount close to that. It is true that some doubt exists as 
to the exact activities of Mr. Mabbutt on October 23, 1981, but viewing the 
uncontradicted portions of the evidence, and the evidence itself as a whole, 
and giving the benefit of the doubt to the applicant, I conclude that Mr. 
Mabbutt did move all of the muck that had accumulated in the sump portion, or 
at least a major portion of it. I find that his work activities on October 
23, 1981, involved usual exertion, especially in light of the problem he was 
having with the pump which had caused such a hugh accumulation of muck in he 
area. When Mr. Mabbutt was seen by Mr. Miller he was clearly stressed and 
pale from his extraordinary efforts that morning. It can hardly be said that 
carrying 130 pounds of muck up a steep 7% slope for 70 feet approximately 50 
times is something he would have done as an activity of every day life. It is 
clear to the Administrative Law Judge that the carrying of all these muck 
buckets was extraordinary exertion under any definition of that term. 
Further, his efforts at freeing the 110 pound sump pump were also 
extraordinary exertions under any definition of the term. Accordingly, 
pursuant to the Allen decision, I find that the work activities of Fred C. 
Mabbutt on October 23, 1981, ". . .contributed something substantial to 
increase the risk he already faced in every day life because of his 
condition." Allen v. Industrial Commission 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) at 25. 
Therefore, although the applicant may have had pre-existing coronary disease, 
his work activities of October 23, 1981, were clearly extraordinary exertion, 
and therefore the legal causation requirement of Allen has been met. The 
applicant must also prove medical causation, in that he must show that the 
"stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation lead to the 
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resulting injury or disability." Allen at 27. In this case, the medical 
panel found that the applicants work activities of October 23, 1981, resulted 
in the resulting death he sustained as the result of a heart attack on October 
23
 f 1981. This finding was also bolstered by an additional medical expert 
that testified on behalf of the applicant9 and is also supported by the 
findings of Dr. Fowles, the defendants medical expert. Put differently, all 
three cardiologists who have submitted reports in this matter conclude that 
the applicants work activities of October 23, 1981, were a sufficient 
precipitating factor resulting in his death by heart attack. 
The employer has also urged that there be an apportionment of 
liability for the death benefits in this case as between it and the Second 
Injury Fund. A review of the file indicates that this issue was first raised 
by the employer in its letter motion for review on October 19, 1987. The 
Administrator of the Second Injury Fund filed a response indicating that the 
belated efforts of the employer to raise the apportionment issue at this late 
date should be dismissed. The Second Injury Fund points out that the employer 
has waived the apportionment of Second Injury Fund liability through their 
inaction. The Administrator points out that this case went through the entire 
death benefit application procedure including an evidentiary hearing, medical 
panel referral and report, hearing on objections to the medical panel report, 
issuance of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, motion for review, 
denial of motion for review, petition for Supreme Court review, Supreme Court 
briefs and oral argument, and a decision from the Utah Supreme Court, which 
provided that the case be remanded to the Commission for the purpose of 
determining what Mr. Mabbutt's actual activities were on October 23, 1981. 
Nowhere in any of those proceedings did the employer see fit to raise the 
apportionment of liability for death benefits as between itself and the Second 
Injury Fund. In fact, the issue was not raised at the second evidentiary 
hearing or the second medical panel referral or after the receipt of the first 
report. Now, at this late date, the employer seeks to involve apportionment 
of the death benefits as between itself and the Second Injury Fund. The 
Second Injury Fund cites the case of Pease v. Industrial Commission 694, P2d 
613 (Utah 1984) for the proposition that where a party files a motion for 
review, they have an obligation to raise all issues that can be presented at 
that time and that those issues which are not raised are waived. In the 
instant case, the employer did not raise the apportionment issue when it first 
filed its motion for review, and it also failed to mention that issue in its 
brief to the Utah Supreme Court in its oral argument or even at the second 
evidentiary hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. It is therefore my 
finding that under the rational of the Pease decision, that the defendant, 
Price River Coal, has waived the apportionment of death benefits in this case. 
In passing, I might note that even if the right to apportionment of 
the death benefits in this case were not waived by the employer, I see no 
basis upon the record to grant the relief they seek. There is no apportioning 
of liability by the defendant's own expert, Dr. Fowles, does not set forth any 
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basis upon which apportionment might be made. On cross-examination, the 
medical panel chairman could not quanify what portion of the substantial 
material contributing factor would have been due to the applicant's 
pre-existing coronary disease, and what might have been due to the unusual 
exertion he performed on October 23, 1981. Dr. Yanowitz also was unable to 
quanify the relationship in this case. In addition, the Second Injury Fund 
has argued that there is no statutory provision allowing for the apportionment 
of death benefits in workers compensation cases. By comparison, the employer 
argues that there is nothing in the Workers Compensation Act to suggest that 
death benefits cannot be apportioned. The arguments of counsel are both 
correct, however, the Administrative Law Judge finds that in the absence of a 
specific statutory provision allowing for the apportionment of death benefits, 
the Administrative Law Judge will not create a right, which has heretofore not 
been allowed by either the Legislature or the Utah Supreme Court. 
Accordingly, the request of the defendants for apportionment of death benefits 
in this case is hereby denied. 
As indicated previously, I have found that Fred C. Mabbutt sustained 
a compensable industrial accident on October 23, 1981, while employed by Price 
River Coal as a belt attendant. On that date, Mr. Mabbutt was earning wages 
sufficient to entitle him to the maximum award for death benefits in the 
amount of $255.00 per week for 312 weeks for a total of $79,560.00. In 
reviewing the file, it appears that these benefits awarded herein will 
terminate effective October 16, 1987. Thereafter, the applicant may be 
entitled to continuing benefits from Price River Coal/CIGNA Insurance upon the 
completion and submission of a Declaration of Dependency form which will be 
sent to her by the Industrial Commission. Mrs. Mabbutt should return that 
form for further processing by the Administrative Law Judge. In the event the 
Declaration of Dependency form indicates that the applicant is still dependent 
upon the benefits of the employer for her continued support, then CIGNA will 
be entitled to an offset of 50% of the applicants social security death 
benefits she is currently receiving. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Fred C. Mabbutt sustained a compensable industrial accident on 
October 23, 1981, while employed by Price River Coal Company. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Price River Coal and/or Cigna Insurance 
pay Marie T. Mabbutt compensation at the rate of $255.00 per week for 312 
weeks for a total of $79,560.00, as compensation for the death of her husband, 
Fred C. Mabbutt. These benefits shall commence effective October 24, 1981, 
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and are due and owing in a lump sum. These benefits shall also include 
interest of 8% per annum commencing effective November 14, 1981, with interest 
continuing until payment is made. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Cigna pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for 
the applicant, the sum of $14,184.00 for services rendered in this matter, the 
same to be deducted from the aforesaid award of the applicant and remitted 
directly to his office. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the issue of Mrs. Mabbutt's continued 
dependency is hereby reserved pending receipt of a Declaration of Dependency 
form from her, which will entitle her to benefits after October 16, 1987, if 
so found by the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Second Injury Fund is hereby dismissed 
as a party defendant in this matter. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Timothy C^ ypwrien 
Adminiisrfrjrtive Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah^Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^ ^ day of February, 1988. 
ATTEST; 
Linda J. Stpasburg 
Commission/Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on February 0/7 . 1988 a copy of the attached 
ORDER in the case of Fred C. Mabbutt issued February &Lf was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Marie T. Mabbutt 
260 West 500 South 
Price, Utah 84501 
Virginius Dabney 
Attorney at Law 
350 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CIGNA 
2180 South 1300 East No. 417 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
James Elegante 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
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* 
MARIE T. MABBUTT, widow of * 
FRED D. MABBUTT, deceased, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
* ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
vs. * 
* AND PARTIALLY GRANTING 
PRICE RIVER COAL COMPANY and/or * 
CIGNA INSURANCE and * CROSS MOTION FOR REVIEW 
SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On December 31, 1986, the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in 
the above-captioned matter, remanding the case to the Industrial Commission to 
more clearly delineate the facts upon which the Administrative Law Judge based 
his finding that legal causation was established. The case involves the death 
of a coal miner who was found dead at the job site and was determined to have 
died due to a heart attack. The deceased was suffering from several 
pre-existing conditions which made him very susceptible to sudden death by 
heart attack. Due to the pre-existing conditions, in order for the death to 
be compensable, it is necessary to establish that the deceased died as result 
of unusual exertion on the job in order to meet the legal causation test. On 
remand, the Administrative Law Judge held an additional hearing to take 
testimony and the Administrative Law Judge thereafter submitted a Summary of 
Testimony to the medical panel for review. The medical panel report and later 
clarification of that report resulted in Objections to the Medical Panel 
Report being filed by counsel for the defendant on October 19, 1987. On 
February 17, 1988, a hearing on Objections to the Medical Panel Report was 
held. Based on that hearing, the Administrative Law Judge determined both 
medical and legal cause were established and thus he issued an Order awarding 
benefits to the widow on February 24, 1988. 
On March 7, 1988, counsel for the defendant filed a Motion for Review 
objecting to the Administrative Law Judge's finding that both legal and 
medical causation had been established. Counsel for the defendant states that 
the medical experts as a whole had concluded it was not necessary that the 
deceased was performing exertive work in order for his heart attack to have 
occurred. Because there was no direct evidence as to the nature of the 
deceased's activities just prior to the heart attack, counsel for the 
defendant concludes there is insufficient evidence on which to base the 
finding that the work activities were unusually exertive (legal causation) and 
the work activities caused the heart attack (medical causation). Counsel for 
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the defendant states that the Administrative Law Judge*s findings of legal and 
medical cause were based on unreasonable factual inferences and speculation. 
On March 10, 1988, counsel for the applicant filed a Cross Motion for 
Review arguing that the Administrative Law Judge should have awarded 
attorney*s fees in addition to benefits awarded as opposed to out of the award 
and that the fees should have been calculated based on a percentage of more 
than just the first six years of benefits plus any interest awarded. Counsel 
for the applicant based this Motion in part on another Administrative Law 
Judge's decision to award fees in addition to the benefits in the Commission 
case Harrison vs Olympic Oil, Inc., case No. 86000733 (January 7, 1988). On 
March 25, 1988, counsel for the defendant filed a Response to the applicant's 
Cross Motion for Review arguing that the applicant's counsel's request for 
fees in addition to the award instead of out of the award was against both 
case law and statute as well as the Commission's own Rule on attorney's fees. 
Counsel for the defendant cites the Utah Supreme Court case Graham vs the 
Industrial Commission . 495 P. 2d 806 (Utah 1972) as authority for the 
proposition that the Commission does not have authority to award fees in 
addition to the benefits as a cost against the defending party. Counsel for 
the defendant further argues that the discretion allowed the Administrative 
Law Judge by the Commission Rule R490-1-4 (b), to vary from the Rule in 
awarding fees to avoid an unconscionable result, does not include discretion 
to award the fees as a cost but merely allows discretion as to the amount of 
the fee to be deducted from the applicant's award. Finally, counsel for the 
defendant states there is nothing "unconscionable" about requiring an 
applicant to pay his own attorney as this is the normal Rule. 
The Commission finds that the two issues on review are: 
1. Whether the Administrative Law Judge's findings of 
legal and medical cause are supported by the facts, and 
2. Whether the attorney's fees should be awarded in 
addition to the widow's benefits and in an amount 
greater than that specified by the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
The Commission finds that the Administrative Law Judge's reliance on the 
testimony of the employees who worked with the deceased and/or were aware of 
the deceased's duties is sufficient basis for a finding that the deceased was 
exerting himself unusually on the date of his attack. The Commission finds 
that it is not absolutely necessary to have eye witness testimony as to the 
activities of the deceased 40 minutes prior to his death in order for the 
Administrative Law Judge to conclude that legal causation is established. 
Furthermore, the Commission finds that the medical evidence regarding 
causation does not have to be stated in terms of absolute proof. In this 
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case, the Commission finds the terms used by the doctors meets the "reasonable 
medical probability" standard adopted by the Industrial Commission and thus 
there is sufficient medical evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge's 
conclusions. Therefore, with respect to the first issue, the Commission must 
deny the defendant's Motion for Review and affirm the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
With respect to the second issue, the Commission finds the 
Administrative Law Judge correctly calculated the fee to be paid the 
applicant's counsel. However, as result of there being no final resolution of 
the attorney fees issue first raised in the Harrison case (cited above), the 
Commission will reserve decision on the payment of attorney fees in addition 
to the award until a final resolution of the attorney fees question in the 
Harrison case has occurred. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's Motion for Review is 
denied, and the the applicant's Cross Motion for Review is partially denied 
with the issue of attorney fees payable in addition to the award reserved 
until a final decision is rendered, in the case Harrison v. Olympic Oil, Inc. 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, case No. 86000733. Except as to the 
issue of attorney fees, the Administrative Law Judge's February 24, 1988 Order 
is affirmed in all respects. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Florez 
Commissioner 
4 ^ 
^ 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Ufeahw Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
^ V ^ - d a y of May, 1988. 
ATTEST: 
ia J. Sifrasburg 
Commission Secretary 
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CIGNA 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
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Attorney at Law 
P. O. Box 11898 
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Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge 
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